Unnatural Disaster: Interrogating the Intersections Between Humanitarian Aid and Vulnerability during Hurricane Katrina

When considering natural disasters, it is a fair assumption to believe that the damage caused is not biased.  A tsunami does not target a certain demographic and avoid others.  It is often believed that storms transcend a society’s systems of dividing its people.  While in theory this is true, it is also true that the impact of a natural disaster is alleviated much more quickly in certain instances.  Hurricane Katrina destroyed certain areas of New Orleans, Louisiana in 2005.  The storm was deadly, but many of those deaths were in regions of the city which were already vulnerable to a disaster such as the storm.  Due to insufficient disaster relief management and development plans, humanitarian aid efforts after the storm were not enough.  Today, many neighborhoods in New Orleans still exist in a state of protracted crises.  Humanitarian aid is reactionary, but if the proactive protections of development fail to serve already vulnerable communities, will humanitarian aid ever be enough after Hurricane Katrina?

In August, 2005, a Category 5 tropical storm hit New Orleans, Louisiana.  This storm, to be named Hurricane Katrina, has become a litmus test for preparedness against natural disasters.  New Orleans had the infrastructure set up to protect its citizens from a Category 3 storm.  Areas of the city had flooding up to 20 feet and over 1,800 lives were lost, primarily elderly citizens from black communities.  Pam Fessler, a reporter for NPR wrote in 2005 that the Army Corps of New Orleans was “pending a $71 million budget cut would delay some crucial levee projects.[1]” This cut in federal funding left levees, dams, and disaster relief infrastructure unfinished when Katrina hit.  Richard Wagenaar, the Commander of New Orleans Corps of Engineers District said, “Do you spend billions and billions and billions of dollars for an event that has never occurred in the history of the United States? Or don't you? How do you prioritize that with all the other national priorities in the last 15 or 20 years? I mean, that's the balancing that past administrations, current administrations and all the congresses have made.

While emphasizing humanitarian aid in the face of immediate crises seems logical, it has not helped New Orleans rehabilitate itself after the storm.  Over ten years later, New Orleans is still in a state of protracted crisis.  Reactionary aid has not solved the problem.  There are still entire neighborhoods that have not been repaired, and people are still grappling with vulnerabilities that existed before the storm as well as new vulnerabilities as a result. After Katrina, many patients with chronic health conditions lost contact with their doctors and could not receive treatment or medication.  Because of insufficient funding, health care and health education in New Orleans is not easily accessible, which results in high populations of people living with health conditions such as diabetes and HIV/AIDS. Many patients who required constant monitoring were not able to receive treatment after the storm and suffered gravely as a result.  As Tulin says, “…consistent access to and use of medication is always a pressing concern for HIV/AIDS patients, and the intricacies of antiretroviral treatments require precise, constant timing and dosages at all times.  But in the aftermath of Katrina, many HIV/AIDS patients lost contact with their healthcare providers and did not know how to properly continue with their treatment.[1]” Grappling with the impact of a natural disaster as extreme as Hurricane Katrina does not require solely direct aid.  It also requires development of infrastructure such as disaster relief plans that institute health care programs in the wake of destruction like Katrina. 

Fessler, Pam. “Why Wasn’t New Orleans Better Prepared?” NPR. NPR, 02 Sept. 2005. Web. 20 Feb. 2017.

Tulin, Leah J. "Poverty and Chronic Conditions during Natural Disasters: A Glimpse at Health, Healing, and Hurricane Katrina." Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law and Policy 14.1 (2007): 115-154.